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FOR RELEASE JUNE 10, 1962
4:00P.M., E.S.T.
INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN SOUTEEAST ASIA
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan
Sunday, June 10, 1962, 4:00p.m., E.S.T.

I am happy to be with you and grateful for the privilege of joining the class of 1962.

It is especially pleasant to be here because of past

contacts with your faculty and, most especially, with my old friend, Ernest
Melby, former Chancellor of the University of Montana.
Members of the Michigan State staff are often encountered in Washington and in the

far-fl1.~ng

corners of the world.

I cannot remember the

nllmber of times, for examp2..e, that I have run into your Professor Wesley
Fishel and my old colleague from Montana, Professor Guy Fox, in Saigon.
Together with the rest of the training-mission of Michigan State, they have
made important contributions to the Republic of Viet Nam.

As for your Presi-

dent, Dr. Hannah, his travel-mileage on behalf of the nation--and, incidentally, Michigan State--is rivaled only by that of the Secretary of State and
Members of Congress.
I have heard it said that the sun never sets on the faculty of
Michigan State.

It is reassuring, therefore, to come here and discover

that the faculty has a natural habitat .

It is such a delightful habitat

one wonders why so many of its members have been persuaded to leave for
the enervating tropics of Asia and Washington.
They have been persuaded, I suspect, even as the nation has been
persuaded, to enter into new channels of international activity, by the
events of the past two decades.

The nation has become deeply committed

I have chonen it, finally, beca•1s
at

is mo1:1ent not to

requir~

I s"lsper:t you e.r

s 1fficiently inS?J.red

an ins Jirat.:.onal spee:: 1 .a.ron m •

shall give you vhat are, in my opinion, tne sobeT facts

o~

~nee,

I

oue v

s:..tuations w.. ich confront the Nation, facts to which you are entltled as
nat~e

men and women, as citizens of the United State~ .
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throughout the world.

Skilled members of this university are among the

thousands of Americans who are working abroad with great dedication to
discharge that commitment.
It is to this commitment, notably, as it is involved in Southeast
Asia which I would address your attention.

I have chosen this subject, in

part, because of the close association which has existed between Michigan
State and Viet Nam.

I have chosen it, too, in part because events appear

to be moving in Southeast Asia tovards a point of critical decision. _L!VseR:t
As you know, we have recently landed combat forces in Thailand.
This movement of troops follows the strengtheni.ng of the United States
military training mission in Viet Nam.

Both steps represent a deepening of

an already very deep involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland.
In this, as in all cases of foreign policy and military command,
the responsibility for the direction of the nation's course rests with the
President.

It is a grave and difficult responsibility.

In discharging it,

the President is entitled to the understanding and support of the nation.
May I say that he has had both in the Senate of the United States, from the
leadership of both parties.

He has kept the Congress fully informed on the

situation as it has developed.

In a similar manner he has tried to keep the

people of the nation informed through his frequent press conferences.
Support of the President does not preclude public discussion of
the situation in Southeast Asia.

On the contrary, it presupposes it.

The

President would be the last to expect a moratorium on public participation
of this kind.

It is politl.cs that needs to stop at the water ' s edge, not

serious consideration of the nation's course in its relations with the rest
of the world.
matter.

Rather than less, we need more public consideration of t his
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The need is especially acute with respect to Southeast Asia.
Until recent times it has been an area remote from the general awareness
of the nation.

It is not surprising that the public, even today, knows

little about the region.

Indeed, it is doubtful that a decade ago, more

than a small fraction of the civilian and military personnel of the government and the journalists who are now immersed in its place-names could have
quickly located the Kingdom of Laos, let alone its towns and villages, on a
map of Asia.
Yet this obscure land on the borders of South China now writes
headline after heaclline in the daily press.

It keeps the lights on through

the night in the Pentagon, the State Department and the Central Intelligence
Agency.

It has been the immediate cause of the dispatch of United States com-

bat forces to Thailand and a partial cause of the strengthening of the military mission in VietNam.

In a decade about $400 million in

u.s.

military

and other aid has gone into this one nation whose population is far smaller
than that of the Detroit Metropolitan region and is scattered in jungle and
hill over an area the size of Oregon.
In 1953 when I first visited Laos, just two junior resident State
Department officials were deemed sufficient for the protection of all United
States interests in the entire country.

Almost a decade later, hundreds of

officials from half a dozen federal agencies--military and civilian--were
on the scene.
This transition in Laos highlights the transition in the United
State s relationship with all of Southeast Asia.

From a minimum of contact

and cost scarcely a dozen yeers ago we have moved, today, to a point of
saturated involvement and immense expense.

This progressive involvement

has not been a party matter--a republican policy or a democratic policy.
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It began und.er a Democratic Administration.
Republican Administration.

It intensified sharply under a

And it is now being dealt with once again by a

Democratic Administration.
The roots of this involvement in Southeast Asia lie in the vast
displocation which was produced in Asia by World War II.

But in a more

specific sense, it dates from the period of the Korean Conflict.
You will recall that about a dozen years ago revolution swept like
a giant tidal wave ttu:ough China.
north, into Korea.

It spilled over the Chinese borders in the

It gave every sign of engulfing Indo-China to the South.

That region, itself, was in the midst of a mixed and confusing Communistnationalist-monarchist upheaval, but in essentials, a revolution against the
reassertion of French colonial control after World War II.
Engaged in the conflict in Korea, we sought for strategic reasons
to prevent Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia.

So we began to go to the

aid, first, of' the French and after them, the successor governments of IndoChina--in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia.
The military situation was eventt1ally stabilized in Korea by
negotiations.

It was also stabilized in Indo-China largely through the

diplomacy which produced the Geneva Agreements of 1954.
A kind of uneasy truce settled over Asia.

But there was no change

in the deep-seated hostility between Chinese communism and the United States.
Peking continued to single us out as the number one enemy of the Chinese
people.

We continued the policy of wartime boycott of the Chinese mainland--

total economic and cultural boycott and almost total diplomatic boycott.

The

military situation in both the Formosan Straits and Korea remained ominous.
The political situation in the divided countries of Laos and Viet Nam remained unsettled.

- 5 -

There followed, then, a United States effort to keep China out of
So'..l.theast Asia and to forestall the spread of communism in that region.

It

was at this point that our direct involvement began to deepen in earnest.
emb~ked

upon a massive military aid program to Southeast Asian nations .

We
All

policy was directed preponderantly to the building of strong anti-connnunist
military establishments and governments.
region uader the protective

umbreJ~a

We sougat, further, to bring the

of t he Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,

SEATO, -which was expected to marshall nations both within and without the area
for a common defense of the region against communi sm.
In Laos and in south Viet Nam, particularly, the immense cost of
sustaining the large military establishments built by

u.s.

military aid re-

quired, in turn, large annual economic aid-subsidies to these countries.
Neither form of aid has had much effect on the economic or social well-being
of the ordinary people of these nations.

The principal gain of these programs

has flowed to a relatively small number of persons in the cities and to military personnel.
In addition, to t his massive military and military-support program
of aid, some effort was made to help improve the l et of the ordinary people
by technic al and other assistance for economic and social development.
Finally, I should mention the extension of the information program
into Southeast Asia.

Again, the contrast in ten years is significant.

From

a minor operation confined largely to the environs of the cities of Saigon
and Bangkok, t he voice of America has been carried by radio and pamphlet and
motion picture , by boat, plane, jeep and f oot and, I would presume even by
e l ephant, into the remotest villages and hamlets of Southeast Asia.
output of words increased massively and impressively.
did the cost toihe people of the United States.

The

So, too, of course,
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Over a ten-year period, the foreign aid-program--military and nonmilitary--alone has resQlted in authorized appropriations of the public funds
of this nation of well over $3 billion for these Southeast Asian nations.
This total does not

~ake

into account the salaries and expenses of the

thousands of military and civilian personnel of the government who have seen
service in the area during this period.

It does not take into account the

cost of our participation in SEATO and consequent mi litary deployments such
as has occurred in recent weeks in and around Thailand.

It does not take

into account the cost of the expansion of the information,

programs and

other government activity.
Altogether, the commitment of resources to Southeast Asia in a
decade has

bee~

enormous by any measureo

Yet it would be a small price to

pay if it were to yield a durable peace and safeguard an
the growth of stable free nations in that region.

opport~ity

for

Unfortunately, the ex-

perience of the past decade is not such as to give rise to sanguine expectations in this respect.
We have the experience of SEATO.

It is difficult to assess its

value in forestalling military adventures by the Communists.
has had some effect;

Perhaps it

it has not.

But one thing has been made very

clear by the recent military deployment.

We have allies under SEATO to be

perhe~s

sure, but allies either unwilling or unable to assume but the smallest fraction of the burdens of the alliance.
member of

SEA~U.

I say that not as criticism of any

Each nation has its own problems and capacities and I do

not presume to judge them.

But this nation, too, has its problems.

And

one of them is to avoid miscalculations in policies which may derive from
the gap between the presumed promise and the actual fulfillment in any military alliance.

INSERT PAGE 7_

Under the leadernhip of President Nyo Dinh Diem,

mnn for vnom I have

the hidlest respect :md t'le deepest admiration, a man 'Whose integrity
and honesty are unquestioned, and

wit~o1t

'Whom there vould be no free

Vietnan, t'lat country has faced e:ldlra.ordilllll'Y difficulties in its
st.-ruwe for s:trVival.

Yet, even in • • •
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We have the experience, too, of Laos.

There has been eight years

of military and other aid of the most intensive, indeed, the most extravagant
kind to that country.

There have been millions of costly words and pictures

and sounds on the virtues of freedom and the evils of communism disseminated
throughout a Kingdom in which, may I say, neither the concept of Western
freedom or We stern communism can have much meaning.

For it is a kingdom of

isolated villagers, still living in a relatively contented, peaceful, Buddhist
culture centuries old.

Eight years of aid and words and other operations, in

the end, have produced scarcely a ripple in Laos, except in the capital city.
And what it produced there, to say the least, does not speak well for it.
Laos is, clearly, in far more danger, today, of a collapse into a kind of
communism under outside domination or, perhaps, to division and destruction
as a nation, than when this whole process began--when the country was led by
one who tried to think and act in terms of the Kingdom's neutralism and
greater self-reliance.
We have the experience of Viet Nam. A la this situation, after years
of military assistance of a most costly kind, it is discovered that the aid
vent to build the wrong kinds of forces and that it is now necessary to build
almost from scratch with the aid of thourends of additional American training
and support f orces and at an even higher level of annual aid.

It is also

discovered that a great deal more emphasis on political and economic development is now required in Viet Nam, although the need for this latter course
has been pointed out time and again in the Congress for many years.
There is no longer any escaping the fact that after years of
enoi'!!IOus expenditures of aid in south Viet Nam, that country is more,
rather than less, dependent on aid from the United States.

VietNam's

independent survival is less rather than more secure than it was five or
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six years ago.

Once again the bombs explode in Saigon as they have not done

since the early days, which Professor Fishel will remember with me, of the
establishment of the Republic in 1953-55·
One can only hope that a similar process of increasing dependency
and increasing insecurity is not now about to begin in Thailand.
I think, in all honesty, that we must c0ntrast these situations
with those which exist in Burma and in Cambodia.

B1~a

has a non-communist

independence which is, at this moment, more secure than that of Laos and
Viet Nam.

Yet it has obtained little aid from us.

Cambodia has received

from us a fraction of the per capita aid which has gone to Viet Nam or Laos.
It has received aid from many countries) including Communist countries.

Yet,

its non-communist independence is certainly not less, it is far more .s ecure
than that of Laos.

Indeed, it is, as of this ffioment, among the most peaceful

and stable of all the nations of Asia.
Now, I think we must realize that situations differ in these various
nations.

Communist and other pressures--internal and external--vary.

historic and strategic circumstances.

So do

But it is not without significance in

our comprehension of the total situation in Southeast Asia that in nations in
which our aid-commitment has been relatively limited, the prospects are no
worse for the survival of non-communist independence than in those in which
we are massively committed.
Before this phenomenon can yield anything of relevance to policy,
however, we must get clearly in mind the interests of this nation in Southeast
Asia which we are trying to protect.

For, I presume, that it is on the basis

of these interests that we have made this great commitment.
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A nation's interests are of two kind8--those which are basic and
enduring and those which are transitory and peripheral.

And history indi-

cates to us that our enduring interests in Southeast Asia are limited.

History

also indicates to us that these limited iuterests in commerce, cu.lture and
security have been, in the past, most effectively safeguarded by a policy of
minimum involvement.

He have, in the past, avoidAd interfering in the internal

political affairs of the Southeast Asian nations.

We have, in the past, mini-

mizedour military commitment on the Southeast Asian mainland--even during the
griremest days of tlorld Har II.

Ttle

have, in the past, given appropriate en-

couragement to the emergence of independent nationhood in the region.

We have,

in the past, sought to act in a fashion which would not tarnish the symbol of
freedom and human decency which this nation has long been in Asia or alienate
the friendship of the peoples of that region, regardJ.ess of what governments
might temporarily hold sway over them.

We have, in the past, through diplomacy,

sought to do our small share in the preservation of peace in that region as part
of our general interest in the ma1 ntene.n-:::e of vrorld peace.
I do not see tha-I' these e•·durlng interests have changr:d in any signif:l.ce.nt degree.

Our commercial and cultural ccntacts with Southe'lst Asia are

still limited.

Our security interests in Southeast Asia, in terms of the de-

fense of the United States are still limited.
Yet, it is obvious that in the past decade the policy of minimum
involvement and, incidentally, minimum cost, by which we have traditionally
defended these limited interests, has shifted about 180° to the point of very
deep involvement and enormous cost.
I have already pointed out how the Korean conflict precipitated this
drastic change in course in Southeast Asia.
is understandable.

How we reached the present point

The question which we have not yet faced, the question
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which may now be approaching the point of critical decisions is whether this
change is to become a permanent part of our foreign policy.

If it is, then

we must be prepared, at best, to carry an annual burden of several hundred
millions of dollars of military and economic subsidies to anti-communist
governments in the region for many years.

We will have to do that whether

or not they are responsive governments in terms of their own peoples needs.
We must be prepared to extend this support in Southeast Asia for the indefinite future through the whole costly mechanism of aid and propaganda.

We

must be prepared to bear the human and material cost of keeping an indeterminate number of combat troops in that region, on garrison duty or for
more serious purposes as may be necessary.
pared to do at best.

All these things we must be pre-

At worst, we must be prepared for a possible conflict

of indefinite depth and duration, dependent largely on our forces for its
prosecution.
These are the facts, the realities of the situation.

Grim as

they are, I believe that it is eminently desirable that they be faced now,
whatever our decisions may be.
In all candor I must ask:

Is a permanent policy of that kind

justified on the basis of any enduring interests of the people of the United
States in Southeast Asia7

Is it more valid now, than in the past, to in-

volve ourselves in internal political situations in the countries of that
region--to maintain any government in a state of quasi-dependency on us for
the indefinite future?

Is it more valid now, than in the past, to assume

the primary burden for the political, economic and social future of these
lands7
I have raised these questions and I would anticipate that you might
raise others.

The fact is that these approaches are, at best, doubtful because
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they are irumensely costly in ratio to any enduring interests of the people
of the

u.s.

in Southeast Asia.

They are doubtful because, in the long run,

they will yield little to the people of this nation and little to the people
of Southeast Asia exce2t a mult iplication of their already immense social
and economic difficulties.

These approaches are doubtful because they bring

upon us a vague responsibility for the internal evolution of the nations of
Southeast Asia, a responsibility which no nation can discharge for another
in this day and age, a responsibility which it is the right and duty of the
people and leacers of those nations themselves to assume, a responsibility
which, after many costly decades, we relinquished in the Philippines wiih
no intention of a s suming elsewhere.
While ttese approaches are doubtful, there is not assurance that
they can be avoided.

We have accumulated binding treaty commitments over

the years and integrity demands that these be honored.

Moreover, one can-

not know what other nations may do in this situation; and at this late hour
any improvement in the situation depends on the attitudes of many governments.

It depends heavily on the Chinese in Peking.

the Soviet Russian government.

It depends heavily on

It depends on political and military leaders

in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in Asia.

Indeed, it depends on all govern-

ments which by reason of their membership in the United Nations have a
measure of responsibility for the maintenance of peace wherever it may be
threatened.
But let there be no doubt that it also depends on us.

Regardless

of these other factors, it remains for us, now, to draw clearly the distinction between what is enduring and basic and what is transitory and peripheral
in our interests with respect to Southeast Asia.

It remains for us to hold

fast to the one and seek actively to minimize the other, to the end that the
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haphazard commitment and waste of resources in which we have indulged for years
in the pursuit not only of our enduring interests but of political slogans and
shibboleths may cease.
To the extent that we do vrhat we ourselves must do, I believe we
shall begin to discern the basis for a
Asia.

ne~>r

approach to policy in Southeast

It will be an approach which will:
(l)

explore actively, intensely

a~d

continuously every possi-

bility of minimizing the unilateral activity of the United States in Southeast
Asia in every sphere;
(2)

re-examine SEATO in the light of the recent experience in

Thailand and not hesitate to attempt to modify or alter it, if other ways of
maintaining peace and independence in Southeast Asia become evident;

(3)

seek vigorously to diffuse, through the United Nations

or through any other feasible grouping of nations, the enormous burden of
assisting nations of Southeast Asia to bring their economies and social
structures more up-to-date;
(4)

place less emphasis on political and military subsidies,

propaganda and other devices of the cold war and more emphasis on a vigorous
and persistent tre.di tional diplomacy for the development of a more stable
situation in the area;
(5)

pay more attention to the manner in which the reasonable

needs and aspirations of the people of the nations of Southeast Asia are being
met by their

gove~nments

in adjusting the whole range of our relations with

those governments;

(6)

study afresh all the political problems of the region

which contain the seeds of expanded conflict, with special attention to the
relevance of the experiences of Burma

and~.
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It is not certain that any of these approaches may be fruitful.
The difficulties which have been encountered on all sides in attempting
to bring about a peaceful settlement in Laos is indicative of what is involved in any significant change from the present course in Southeast Asia.
But difficulties of change, notwithstanding, the fact
present course is, as it has been for a long

tim~,

remai~s

that the

at best, a mark-time

course of years and decades of immense cost to the people of the United
States and, at worst, it is a collision course .
It is clearly in the interests of this nation to adjust that
course if it is at all possible to do so with honor and decency.

May I

say, further, that this nation owes apology to no nation if it seeks to
lighten its commitments in Southeast Asia through a vigorous

diplomacy-~as

we have been doing with respect to Laos--and a much more discriminating and
prudent use of its resources.

We have done our share,

to sustain friendly governments in Asia.

~

than our share

We will go on doing it.

meet treaty commitments which are binding on our honor .

We will

But, at the same

time, let there be no doubt that the time is long past due when we must
explore every avenue which may lead to a situation in Southeast Asia, less
dependent on the resources of this nation for its cement .

In the search for

that situation the President needs the understanding and support of the nation
and I have no doubt that it will be forthcoming.

